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The Waite Court and the Fourteenth Amendment*
HowARD JAY GRA-Am**
Certainly not many lawyers could have stood it, fewer would have,
and no one else has had to: Morrison R. Waite alone was "His
Accidency"--successor to the great Salmon P. Chase; President Grant's
seventh choice for seventh Chief Justice; "that luckiest of all indi-
viduals known to the law, an innocent third party without notice."'
"Dean of Toledo's Bar, A Common lawyer indeed!" Democrats
chortled. "A new man that would never have been thought of for
the position," Justice Field remarked, "by any person except President
Grant... an experiment which no President has a right to make with
our Court." Named and confirmed, eight-and-a-half months after
Chase's death; after, in that incredible sequence, Roscoe Conkling,
Hamilton Fish, and Senators Timothy 0. Howe and Oliver P. Morton
each had declined unsolicited proffers, and after, in the most humili-
ating climax imaginable, the names of George H. Williams, Grant's
incompetent, if not corrupt Attorney General, and Caleb Cushing, an
overage (and, opponents claimed, senile) partisan opportunist, each
had gone to the Senate, then been withdrawn to escape certain
rejection.
"A hard parturition," Secretary of State Fish described it in his
diary; and the unfazed Williams, surveying assembled Justices and
fellow disappointees at a banquet on the eve of Waite's swearing-in,
muttered sotto voce, "Did you ever see so many corpses at one
funerall"2
"His Accidency," "experiment" or not, Morrison R. Waite made a
good, in some respects outstanding, Chief Justice; served the four-
teen years 1874-1888; confounded critics and skeptics alike; won over
the colleagues who at first had snubbed him; scorned talk of the
Presidency; worked himself literally to death; and managed, without
judicial experience, to fill the highest judicial office creditably, at
times with a modest distinction.
Rugged, amiable, unpartisan, a small-town property lawyer with
thirty-five years of circuit riding and general practice behind him,
*Being in part a review of Morrison R. Waite: The Triumph of Character. By C.
Peter Magrath. New York: The Macmillan'Company, 1963. Pp. viii, 334. $10.
**Los Angeles, California. B.S. 1927, Whitman College; M.A. 1930, University of
California. Guggenheim Fellow.
1. MAGRATH, MomusoN R. WArE: THE TR iPH OF C Ruc=m 97 (1963).
2. ibid.
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Waite certainly was not the tyro or the "Jonah" cynics and the public
had feared. Unprepossessing, "a short, thickset person with very plain-
indeed rough features," Field described him, "yet gentlemanly and
dignified." "Take the place that belongs to you," he once counseled
his nervous wife, "not offensively, but let everyone feel it is yours."3
Waite had in abundance precisely those qualities he needed most:
stamina, poise, a sense of fitness, integrity, capacity for growth. If
President Grant might have done better, he might also have done-
and too often did-much worse.
Waite's public record at nomination unquestionably was "thin,"
yet not undistinguished. Son of a chief justice of Connecticut, well
educated and studious, a Yale graduate who emigrated at once to the
Toledo region, he served single terms in Ohio's House and on the
Toledo council, was twice defeated as a Whig-Republican for Con-
gress, and during the Civil War declined appointment to Ohio's court.
Successful service as the United States' third lawyer at the Geneva
arbitrations brought national recognition in 1873, and he was serving
as President of the Ohio Constitutional Convention when the astound-
ing news came that he was Grant's final nominee.
The big job and underachievement thus had never been problems
for Morrison R. Waite. Letters written to his ailing wife during the
first weeks in Washington reveal almost unbearable strain.4 "Judge
Clifford is the martinetest of all martinetts [sic]." 5 Opinion writing
came hard and always remained so. "The difficulty with me is that
I cannot give the reasons as I wish I could," he once told Field, who
suffered no such handicap.6 Like Beveridge, Magrath has an eye and
a gift for portraiture. Glimpses such as these, winnowed by the dozen
from the voluminous heretofore-unused Waite Papers at the Library
of Congress, make for a striking work. Morrison R. Waite was indeed
an extraordinary ordinary man. His was "the triumph of Character,"
-of character over Gilded Age circumstance, the very definition of
high and rewarding comedy. This is a judicial biography in every
sense, and a portrait of distinction.
Waite concededly was no John Marshall. Yet he was hardly less
the man and judge for his times-Chief Justice for a strong Court, as
Marshall had been for a weak one; a needed balance wheel; a shrewd
judge of men and character (Waite saw through Roscoe Conkling
for example, mistrusting and dismissing him as an unsavory boss and
"henchman"); a Chief who declined to be pressured or browbeaten
3. Id. at 103.
4. Id. ch. 6.
5. Id. at 103.
6. Id. at 185.
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by Field," who made full use of Bradley's scholarship and Miller's
powers, who held his Court together under the most crushing docket
and arrearages of its history, who finally, during an illness in 1885,
had the satisfaction of an acknowledgement from Miller that the Chief
Justiceship was a far bigger job that he had realized-this from the
Justice who ten years before had been more pejorative even than Field
("mediocre,. "a sow's ear")8 yet who, presiding at conferences in
Waite's absence (and none too successfully), came to the fairer esti-
mate.9
Magrath avoids extended retreatment of the familiar leading cases.
Instead there are concise summaries and evaluations of the Court's
work in the principal fields: reconstruction, race, economic and corpo-
rate regulation. Case law, social setting, monographic literature, let-
ters and memoranda are skillfully synthesized, with focus sharply
personal and biographic. Waite and his Court relive in these pages,
and there are admirable accounts of intra-Court liaison and one
brilliantly researched and written chapter-"Court Packing in the
Gilded Age'-details for the first time, from the Garfield and Whitelaw
Reid Papers, the pressures that culminated in Stanley Matthews'
renomination to the Court in 1881.
Another most significant discovery shows how unhistorical and
chancy the decision in the 1883 Civil Rights Cases'0 really was. From
Mr. Justice Bradley's majority opinion (which in effect declared un-
constitutional sections 1 and 5 of the fourteenth amendment)-and
certainly from the pother since over the nature and limits of "state"
and "private" action-one might guess that the framers of this phrase-
ology were mere logic choppers who regarded slavery as a paper
dragon. Actually they were men who knew and dealt with that insti-
tution as one which emancipation had barely touched. Slavery for
them was a system of caste-of institutionalized race prejudice, disa-
bility, and discrimination." Countless cultural residues-"badges,
incidents and indicia" were the current tags-remained to be eradi-
cated. Deeply rooted in thought and custom, these could be reached
7. Id. at 258-60.
8. Id. at 107, 271-72.
9. Id. at 273.
10. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
11. See generally TENEROEK, THE ANmTSLAVERY ORINS OF FOuRTEENTH
A .m-mmmr (1951); Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protec-
tion of the Laws," 50 CoLum. L. REv. 131 (1950); Graham, Our "Declaratory"
Fourteenth Amendment, 7 STAN. L. REv. 3 (1954); Graham, Procedure to Substance-
Extra-Judicial Rise of Due Process, 1830-1860, 40 CALF. L. REv. 483 (1952); Graham,
The Early Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1950 Wis. L. REv.
479, 479-507, 610-61; Graham, The Fourteenth Amendment and School Segregation,
3 BuFFALO L. REv. 1 (1953); Kelly, The Fourteenth Amendment Reconsidered: The
Segregation Question, 54 Micir. L. Rxv. 1049 (1956).
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under the federal system only if both Congress and the courts were
given added constitutional powers to deal with the lingering "abridg-
ments," "denials" and "deprivations." That was the whole purpose and
effect of sections 1 and 5. Many thought the thirteenth amendment
already had gone the whole way, but Bingham and the moderates
thought best to play it safe. Accordingly they "constitutionalized"
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which itself of course specifically reached
and voided discriminations grounded in "custom" as well as in laws,
statutes, etc.
All this was taken for granted and went without saying in the late
1860's and '70's. It underlay and informed Justice Miller's forceful
statement in the Slaughter-House Cases,'2 and it repeatedly was made
explicit in congressional speeches and papers. Backsliding and hedging
developed later and culminated in the sectional bargain or "settle-
ment" of 1877.13 justice Bradley's Civil Rights opinion thus was in-
deed "a period piece"'k-an accommodation to national inertia and
letdown, to the absurd belief that if the country only would ignore
vestigial racism (and the then-recent constitutional pledges) the prob-
lems might disappear.
What Magrath now brings to light is an exchange of correspond-
ence'5 showing that Mr. Justice Bradley himself, in 1871, was re-
sponsible for the wording of one of the clearest and soundest early
constructions of the fourteenth amendment. Circuit Judge Woods of
New Orleans had written him for guidance in the today-too-little-
12. 83 U.S. 36 (1873). See the passage quoted at note 47 infra.
13. Dr. Magrath's treatment of these matters, and of Waite's relation to Reconstruc-
tion and to race problems and cases generally, MAcnATH, op. cit. supra note 1, chs.
7-9, will seem to many perhaps the least satisfactory section of his book. The problem-
even the biographic problem at this date-is not simply to show that Waite and his
colleagues-all able and conscientious men, to be sure-were "men of their times." They
were men of their times and of a generation who in the end guessed wrong, who
abandoned and betrayed the principles and the constitutional theory which they them-
selves in many instances had held, understood, and approved-more, or better perhaps,
than John Marshall Harlan had at first. The trouble was they did not see, as Harlan
did, that to defer this problem, above all to deny Congress power to deal with it, was to
aggravate it, to let the mores of the slave system and era harden, scatter, and consolidate
under freedom. By reason of his apostasy, of his great learning, intellect, and sway over
Waite and Woods, Mr. Justice Bradley is a truly tragic figure in our constitutional his-
tory; Harlan-patronized by Holmes and others as a commonplace intellect-becomes
truly heroic. One must read deeply in both the proslave and antislave arguments, and in
the congressional debates, to appreciate fully the soundness, scholarship, and learning of
Harlan's Civil Rights dissent; the majesty of the prose and the wisdom of the policy
judgments today are self evident. See Westin, John Marshall Harlan and the Constitu-
tional Rights of Negroes: The Transformation of a Southerner, 66 YALE L.J. 637 (1957).
14. Roche, Civil Liberty in an Age of Enterprise, 31 U. Cm. L. RBv. 103, 108
(1963).
15. Excerpted and discussed more fully in Roche, supra note 14 at 108-10 See also
MAGRATH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 121. The Bradley Papers are in the custody of the
New Jersey Historical Society.
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studied case of United States v. Hall.'6 A peaceful Republican gather-
ing of Negroes engaged in political discussion had been broken up
by armed whites who killed two and wounded more than fifty. Ala-
bama's authority had been involved by the state's failure to provide
protection. Perceiving that the fourteenth amendment laid an affirma-
tive obligation on the states to protect the freedmen and to secure
equality of rights in this regard, Justice Bradley advised Woods:
Congress has a right, by appropriate legislation, to enforce and protect such
fundamental rights, against unfriendly or insufficient State legislation. I say
unfriendly or insufficient; for the XIVth Amendment not only prohibits the
making or enforcing of laws which shall abridge the privileges of the citizen;
but prohibits the states from denying to all persons within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws. Denying includes inaction as well as action.
And denying the equal protection of the laws includes the omission to
protect as well as the omission to pass laws for protection.17
In his subsequent opinion,18 Judge Woods incorporated verbatim
this passage which begins "Denying includes inaction as well as
action." That, in short, in 1871 was still the proper and prevalent
view, as is shown by similar statements made in Congress. 9 Today
it strikes us as odd at first only because common sense has suffered
so long under the state action syndrome. To get back to reality, to
sense the mood and the urgency of 1866-to say nothing of 1964--
what would we think today, what would the world think, of pleadings
or decisions in German or international courts contending that the
measures taken in our time against genocide and for purging of racism
had no intended place, could have no permitted effect, wherever
discrimination or outrage were derivative from, or were perpetrated
(or perpetuatedl) by, "custom," "individual prejudice," "private
action"? If "the mischief determines and measures the remedy," must
not the evil do likewise? Can it be supposed rational minds reason,
legislators legislate, amenders amend on any other basis? Slavery
and its residues were as hateful and repugnant in 1866 as Nazism
has been in our time. Governments were deemed governments in
1866 precisely as now. The function, the duty of governments is to
protect. The declared function, the declared duty of American gov-
ernments under this phraseology was then, is now, to protect equally.
Where, in nine centuries of Anglo-American constitutional and legal
history can be found folly, failure, recalcitrance to match this? Had
16. 26 Fed. Cas. 79 (No. 15282) (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871).
17. Letter from Bradley to Woods (draft), March 12, 1871. The correspondence
began with a letter from Woods to Bradley, December 24, 1870.
18. United States v. Hall, supra note 16, at 81.
19. See, e.g., the remarks of Senator John Pool of North Carolina, CONG. GLOBE,
41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3611 (1870), and the congressional debates on the KK Act,
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. 575-80, 693-94 (1871).
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constitutionality of civil rights enforcement been decided in 1871,
think what this nation would have been sparedl
Turn now to a parallel development. Nowhere in the United States
Reports are there to be found words more momentous or more baffling
than these:
Mr. Chief Justice Waite said: The court does not wish to hear argument on
the question whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws, applies to these corporations. We are
all of the opinion that it does. 20
Measured by apparent repercussions, by generated case law, and
by presumed talismanic effects and powers in Populist-Progressive-
New Deal America, this oral statement-the Santa Clara "rule" or
"dictum" of 1886-remains today, even in limbo, the outstanding
"holding" of the Waite era. Here are the magic words which served
to corporatize section 1 of the fourteenth amendment; which in so
doing eventually made Every Businessman His Own Constitutional
Lawyer, and more extraordinarily still, made Roscoe Conkling a
plausible draftsman-historian in spite of himself. Here, in short, are
the words which generated, almost spontaneously, that preposterous,
now discredited "Conspiracy Theory"21 which in turn happily proved
the nemesis of what it purported to explain.
For those who wonder what light the Waite Papers have shed in
this area, there are two dazzling, stroboscopic flashes. Yet all that
these tantalizing glimpses really make clear and certain is that even
the recording of this statement was a fluke-the Court reporter's after-
thought!
Preparing text for Volume 118 of the U.S. Reports, J. C. Bancroft
Davis, the Supreme Court Reporter, cautiously addressed this note to
Waite:22
20. Santa Clara County v. So. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886).
21. See Graham, The "Conspiracy Theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 YALs
L.J. 371 (1938), reprinted in Ass'N OF Am. LAW ScHooLs, SELECTED EssA s ON CON-
s-ITOTIoNAL LAW 236-67 (1938); Graham, The "Conspiracy Theory" of the Four-
teenth Amendment: 2, 48 YALE L.J. 171 (1938) [hereinafter cited as Graham, Con-
spiracy Theory 2]; Graham, "The Court, the Corporation and Conkling Revisited," a
paper read at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association, Washington,
D.C., December 28, 1961. Other articles on the corporate "person" are: Graham,
An Innocent Abroad: The Constitutional Corporate "Person," 2 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 155
(1955) [hereinafter cited as Graham, Corporate Person]; Graham, "Builded Better
Than They Knew" Pt. 1: The Framers, the Railroads, and the Fourteenth Amendment,
17 U. Prrr. L. REV. 537 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Graham, "Builded Better Than
They Knew"].
22. Davis to Waite, May 26, 1886 (exactly four months after Waite's announcement),




I have a memorandum in the California Cases
Santa Clara County
V.
Southern Pacific &c &c
as follows:
In opening the Court stated that it did not wish to hear argument on the
question whether the Fourteenth Amendment applies to such corporations as
are parties in these suits. All the Judges were of opinion that it does.
Please let me know whether I correctly caught your words and oblige.
Waite replied:
I think your mem. in the California Railroad Tax cases expresses with
sufficient accuracy what was said before the argument began. I leave it with
you to determine whether anything need be said about it in the report in-
asmuch as we avoided meeting the constitutional question in the decision.
23
"In other words," Magrath concludes, "to the Reporter fell the deci-
sion which enshrined the declaration in the United States Reports.
Had Davis left it out, Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R. Co.
would have been lost to history among thousands of uninteresting tax
cases."
24
So here at last, "now for then," is that long-delayed birth certificate,
the reason this seemingly momentous step never was justified by
formal opinion. Think, in this instance too, what the United States
might have been spared had events taken a slightly different turn.
Beyond that, anticlimax and bathos are palpable. Indeed, like
ornithologists who have happened on skeletons, fledglings, platypus
and dinosaur shells and bones, all in one immense cuckoos' nest, Dr.
Magrath and I have come to realize, perhaps better than most, that
luck in research sometimes is not all it seems. A series of articles25
and this judicial biography are not quite the places to unravel mys-
teries of this order. Still less, doubtless, is a book review. Yet as the
explorer who naively wandered into these parts of that Dark (colo-
nized) Continent-Conklinia, Corporataria (as we knew them then)
and at length progressed into the "underdeveloped" Antislavery and
Negro Territories-yes, that route itself now is a personal and national
scandal-and more recently as one who at the opening of the Waite
23. MAGRATH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 224. Letter from Waite to Davis, May 31,
1886, Bancroft Davis Papers, on file in Library of Congress.
24. MAGnATH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 224. The remainder of Dr. Magrath's state-
ment seems to me to suffer from over-compression and from looking at the statement
from too many angles and dates simultaneously. He sees and says clearly however
that Waite must have regarded his statement as "a fairly routine instruction to coun-
sel . . . "A typographical error, id. at 221, misdates the San Mateo appeal to the
Supreme Court as 1883 (for 1882).
25. As listed in notes 21 & 11 supra, with a third series on frontier taxation, ante-
bellum due process and equal protection being completed.
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Papers in 196026 also met, and not unexpectedly, "Dr. Livingstone, I
presume," in the person of this ludicrous Waite-Davis exchange, I
shall here briefly set down some reflections and a hypothesis in the
perhaps vain hope we may now liquidate this scandalous mystery and
get on with the real business of the fourteenth amendment.
First the hypothesis. Just how are we to interpret Waite's casual,
offhand expressions, "I think," "sufficient accuracy, "leave it with you
to determine," as used in his reply to Davis?
One thing seems certain: these emphatically are not the words
we conceive a Chief Justice of the United States ever likely to use
if he has in mind what he and his associates have understood and
intended to be a formally adjudicated, announced, unanimous rule
prospectively applicable to corporations generally. This, to be sure,
is only a conclusion, an inference; yet it is one few students of the
Court, and of the judicial process, will hesitate to draw. Something
decidedly less than a general per curiam rule is indicated as being
recollected here. Furthermore, "whether anything need be said about
it in the report inasmuch as we avoided meeting the constitutional
question in the decision-Waite's own clearly manifest doubt-not
only underscores this inference, but supplies the further clue: Waite's
recollection obviously is of something conditional, something minor,
informal, and case-limited, something almost routine for a presiding
judge directing oral argument. Waite is thinking, one ventures to
suggest, not of a general prospective rule, but of an impromptu verbal
instruction which he as Chief, on his own knowledge and initiative,
as the Court's administrative head, had given "in opening" and
"before the argument began"-an informal request to Southern Pacific
counsel designed to focus and expedite argument in this one Santa
Clara case; something perhaps to this effect: "The Court does not
wish to hear further argument on whether the Fourteenth Amendment
applies to these corporations. That point was elaborately covered
in 1882, and has been re-covered in your briefs. We all presently are
clear enough there. Our doubts run rather to the substance. Assume
accordingly, as we do, that your clients are persons under the Equal
Protection Clause. Take the cases on from there, clarifying the Cali-
fornia statutes, the application thereof, and the merits."
Counsel at least appear to have done exactly that, and the Court,
as Waite's reply indicates, once more proceeded to dispose of the
cases on nonconstitutional grounds and again in a way that dis-
tressed and disappointed Justice Field. Justice Harlan's opinion for
26. Using the Waite Papers in April, 1960, I discovered the Davis-Waite exchange,
learned of Magrath's forthcoming study, and deferred research and publication accord-
ingly. Our conclusions thus have been arrived at independently.
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the majority upset the taxes, but did so on a technicality that had
not been argued or considered at all in the cases at circuit; namely,
that the whole assessment was a nullity inasmuch as the State Board
of Equalization had included therein the fences along the lines at a
value of three hundred dollars per mile, whereas a very detailed
statute gave the Board power to assess only "the franchise, roadway,
road-bed, rails, and rolling stock." 7 Justice Field concurred in the
judgments, but deplored the fact that the Court had not conceived it
to be
its duty to decide the important constitutional questions involved, and par-
ticularly the one which was so fully considered in the Circuit Court, and
elaborately argued here, that in the assessment, upon which the taxes
claimed were levied, an unlawful and unjust discrimination was made
between the property of the defendant and the property of individuals, to
its disadvantage, thus subjecting it to an unequal share of the public
burdens, and to that extent depriving it of the equal protection of the laws
* * *"At the present day nearly all great enterprises are conducted by
corporations ... [a] vast portion of the wealth ... is in their hands. It
is, therefore, of the greatest interest to them whether their property is sub-
ject to the same rules of assessment and taxation as like property of natural
persons ...whether the State ...may prescribe rules for the valuation
of property for taxation which will vary according as it is held by individ-
uals or by corporations. The question is of transcendent importance, and
it will come here and continue to come until it is authoritatively decided in
harmony with the great constitutional amendment which insures to every
person, whatever his position or association, the equal protection of the
laws; and that necessarily implies freedom from the imposition of unequal
burdens under the same conditions. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31.2
Why the majority had declined to go along with Field is as obvious
as his own distress. Dr. Magrath summarizes the evidence in part.29
Field had repeatedly embarrassed Waite and the Court by close
association with the Southern Pacific proprietors and by zeal and
bias in their behalf. He had thought nothing of pressuring Waite
for assignment of opinions in various railroad cases, of placing his
friends as counsel for the road in upcoming cases, of hinting at
courses he and they should take, even of passing on to such counsel
in the undecided San Mateo case "certain memoranda which had been
handed me by two of the Judges."30 His decisions and opinions at
27. Santa Clara County v. So. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 412 (1886).
28. County of San Bernardino v. So. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 417, 422-23 (1886)
(concurring opinion).
29. The following summary is based primarily on Graham, Mr. Justice Field and
the Fourteenth Amendment, 52 YALE L.J. 851-89 (1943) [hereinafter cited as Graham,
Field].
30. Field to John Norton Pomeroy, Washington, D.C., March 28, 1883, published
as letter III, Graham, ed., Four Letters of Mr. Justice Field, 47 YALE L.J. 1100-08
(1938) [hereinafter cited as Graham, ed., Field Letters].
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circuit in this case moreover had been needlessly broad and eco-
nomically naive. To hold, as he had, that the mortgage on the Southern
Pacific "exceeds $3,000 per mile," when in fact it exceeded $43,000
per mile-nearly three times the contested assessed value-was damn-
ing in itself, and doubtless the reason the Court withheld decision in
1883. Later that year Field obligingly heard the second round of
cases at circuit. Detailing now the facts of the mortgage situation
in his opinion, he still held California's classifications to be a denial
of equal protection of the laws, and even soberly advised the state
to let the railroad go tax free, to simply assess the mortgages "as in
the case of natural persons."3' Field's associates and subordinates
frequently were amused, irritated, or nonplussed by such aberrations,
as they were also by his disastrous ventures into Presidential politics,32
by his plan (if elected) to enlarge the Supreme Court to twenty-one
members and pack it with "able and conservative men."m
In other respects, Field had been luckier and more successful.
Commencing in 1874 he had maneuvered ingeniously to give his dis-
sents in the Slaughter-House, Granger, and Sinking Fund cases an
independent life and statement in the law of his own Ninth Circuit.,,
In a series of unappealed (generally nonappealable habeas corpus)
cases involving rights of the persecuted Chinese minority to employ-
ment and equal protection, Field gave much broader scope than the
full Court at these dates formally had to the words "person," "liberty"
and "property." Consciously or unconsciously, he also replanted and
cultivated his "right to pursue the lawful callings" doctrine so that it
finally emerged as an inchoate version of "liberty of contract." That
Field and his circuit colleagues did all this in defense of a persecuted
racial minority (one which, unlike the now deserted freedmen, had
powerful steamship, mining, and railroad allies to help wage their
constitutional battles) rather obscured orientations at first, may even
have won him the majority's wholehearted encouragement.
What happened and mattered was that California bigots asked for
and got the judicial intervention under the fourteenth amendment
others currently were denied, and Field, as always, parlayed his dicta
beautifully. 3 When in 1879-1880 the new state constitution and laws
31. On the various Railroad Tax cases at circuit, see Graham, Corporate Person
179-184, 204 n.208.
32. See generally Graham, Field 877-80, for Field as vieved especially by Judges
Sawyer and Deady.
33. Id. at 880-82; the quotation is from Field's letter to Pomeroy, July 28, 1884,
published as cited in note 30 supra.
34. On the "Ninth Circuit law," see Graham, Field 881-88, and correspondence and
materials there cited.
35. See id. at 884 n.125 for the earlier stages of the development; and notes 43 &
48 infra for the later stages. Note especially Field's phrasing of the dicta in County
of San Mateo v. Southern Pac. R.R., 13 Fed. 145, 149-52 (C.C. Cal. 1882).
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prohibited California corporations from employing Chinese, bigotry
at last relit and held the candle for the American corporate bar.
Timing was equally miraculous and sociological. Nearly nine years
before, in 1871, Circuit Judge Woods of New Orleans had ruled,
almost simultaneously with his holding in United States v. Hall, that
foreign insurance companies (which till then had kept stubbornly
trying to corporatize citizenship under the old comity clause, and had
turned to the fourteenth amendment only in desperation) were not
"citizens" or "persons" under the new section 1.6 In passing we may
note that this situation in itself of course is convincing disproof of old
notions about "slick" or even "intuitive" draftsmanship.
The significant fact about Woods' holding in Insurance Co. v. New
Orleans is that it was virtually ignored-honored mainly in the breach.
Corporate counsel went right on invoking due process and equal pro-
tection, and courts-including the Waite Court-went right on permit-
ting and hearing them, reasoning no doubt, or presuming, that if
corporations were not "persons," shareholders at least were, and
corporate property was "property."37 Alarmists and critics including
Field were repeatedly contending that legislatures and the Court alike
were increasingly "hostile" to corporations. So the long-suffering Mil-
ler-Waite majority leaned backward, went on hearing arguments,
deciding cases on the merits to disprove loose talk. Due process long
since had become a favorite and respected weapon, a justifier of
legislation. In 1856 the Supreme Court had held, unanimously, that
the guarantee restrained all three branches; Congress had not been
left "free to make any process 'due process of law' by its mere will."
And three years before, in 1853, Waite himself as counsel had invoked
due process on behalf of the Toledo Bank39 in vain to be sure, with no
exploration or even mention of corporate personality as such, but like
other business counsel with hard or novel cases at this time, making
the plea for what it was worth.40 No one need be surprised therefore
that early in his Sinking Fund opinion of 1879 Waite observed that
36. Insurance Co. v. New Orleans, 13 Fed. Gas. 67 (No. 7,052) (C.C.La. 1871);
for the background and history of this case, see Graham, Corporate Person 166-70.
37. Id. at 176-77, especially nn.89-91.
38. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. (59 U.S.) 272 (1856).
39. See Bank of Toledo v. City of Toledo, 1 Ohio St. 622, 633-34 (1853); "Waite
and Young, attorneys for the plaintiff." See Graham, Conspiracy Theory 2 n.12;
MAGRATH, op. cit. supra note 1, 44-45, 64, discusses the case without reference to
due process; sections 1 and 16 of the Ohio Bill of Rights, Constitution of 1851, based
on sections 1 and 7 of the Constitution of 1802, were not the conventional due process
clause, but rather the "All courts shall be open . . . due course of law . . ." form.
40. See, e.g., the arguments of William Curtis Noyes for various insurance com-
panies in 1854, discussed in Graham, Conspiracy Theory 2, 178 nn.38-39; see also id.
at 179 nn.45-47 for Pennsylvania cases of the 1850s, discussed more fully in Graham,
"Builded Better Than They Knew" passim.
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while the contract clause did not apply to the Federal government,
"equally with the States [the United States] are prohibited from de-
priving persons or corporations of property without due process of
law."41
And right at this time the new California Constitution forbade
corporations to employ Chinese and denied to the Stanford-Hunting-
ton railroads the privilege of deducting their mortgages.4 The
corporate "person" thus emerged from hibernation in Parrott's Chinese
Case,43 but was fully, approvingly developed only in the San Mateo4
case at circuit and only after the California court 45 had rejected the
railroads' due process and equal protection pleas (citing, as a basis,
Insurance Co. v. New Orleans). Shortly afterward the companies
removed to Field's court and later retained Conkling for the show-
down fight. More crucial and basic than the corporate "person" was
whether the equal protection clause had curbed the state taxing
power. A dictum Justice Miller had inserted-perhaps as a scarecrow
-in his opinion in Davidson v. New Orleans4 implied it had not.
Beyond this obstacle was the equally restrictive language of Miller's
opinion in the Slaughter-House cases: "the one pervading purpose
... " of this amendment, and indeed of all the war amendments, had
been "the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establish-
ment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman
from the oppressions of those who formerly exercised unlimited domin-
ion over him."4
7
Where then, had all this left the Southern Pacific? Precariously
exposed seemingly, but not high and dry: "The Ninth Circuit law" now
more than proved its worth. Thankful indeed were railroad counsel
-including Professor John Norton Pomeroy, who had been retained
at Field's suggestion-to cite the growing line of Chinese precedents
on the larger scope and "true meaning" of Section 1. Gratified indeed
too was Field to be handed such persuasive authority. The circuit
opinions in the San Mateo case make interesting reading today, but
one point tends to get overlooked: Judge Sawyer expressly held
corporations to be "persons" under section 1, but Field, anxious no
doubt to avoid headon collision with the now-Mr. Justice Woods,
"looked through!' the corporation to the individual shareholders as
41. 99 U.S. 700, 718 (1879).
42. See Graham, Corporate Person 175-76, 180-81, and materials therein cited.
43. Id. at 175-76, especially nn.87-88, for background of In re Tiburcio Parrott, 1
Fed. 481 (C.C. Cal. 1880); see also Graham, Field 884 nn.125-32.
44. See note 35 supra.
45. See Graham, Corporate Person 181 nn.115-16.
46. 96 U.S. 97, 106 (1878): "[W]e know of no provision in the Federal Constitu-
tion ...which forbids unequal taxation by the States."
47. 16 Wall. (83 U.S.) 36, 71 (1873).
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natural persons, while at the same time extolling equal protection and
the Fourteenth Amendment as needed bulwarks for corporate property
-"a perpetual shield against all unequal and partial legislation by the
States."4
8
These of course also were the themes of the celebrated San Mateo
arguments of December 1882. Conkling in particular recycled, sup-
plemented, and falsely buttressed Field's points.49 The result was
a forgery-riddled tour de force-gabled, gilt Hollywood Gothic. Yet,
sixteen years after the drafting (and eleven after Insurance Co. V.
New Orleans) even Roscoe Conkling knew better than to say or hint
that he and his colleagues definitely had understood and intended
that corporations were "persons" under these two clauses. His argu-
ment was primarily an attack on the narrow Slaughter-House rule
and an appeal to the Court to regard the amendment as a curb on the
state taxing power, as a bulwark against "unequal taxation." These
of course were the indispensable propositions for the railroad. (The
corporate "person" merely looked so to us once it had emerged as the
doctrinal result of the cases.) Conlding's prime innuendo, which the
Beards and all of us so long misread, was that because corporations
had been petitioning for relief from discriminatory state taxes while
the amendment was being drafted and ratified, the framers and Con-
gress "must have intended" to curb the state taxing power.
Conkling's misquotations from the Joint Committee journal tied in
with this argument, and at yet another point he juggled facts and texts
to imply that a section which Congress in 1870 had added to the civil
rights acts to kill California's discriminatory taxes against the Chinese
demonstrated that Congress had understood that the fourteenth
amendment had been designed to curb all unequal taxation and that
the judiciary had in fact been left free to decide what was equal and
what was not. This was pure fabrication-innuendo developed oblique-
ly and directly contrary to fact; Congress repeatedly in the 1 86 0's and
70's had refused to curb the states' taxing power, especially in matters
involving corporate taxation; and the avowed, the manifest purpose
of that section 16 of the act of 1870 had been to kill California's anti-
Chinese miners and passenger taxes. Race discrimination, in short,
had been the target in 1870, just as it had been in 1866.50 Conkling
48. County of San Mateo v. Southern Pac. R.R., 13 Fed. 722, 741 (C.C. Cal. 1882);
see also the earlier opinion denying motion to remand, 13 Fed. 145 (C.C. Cal. 1882).
49. See Graham, supra note 12, 47 YALE L.J. at 375-85; Graham, Corporate Person
194, and the updated account in my address, "The Court, The Corporation and
Conkling Revisited," supra note 21.
50. On this episode, ignored in the original studies, see Conkling's argument re-
printed in Proceedings of the Committee on the Judiciary Regarding Railroad Tax Suits,
California Legislature, Assembly, 28th Sess., Journal Appendix, v. 8, no. 3, at p. 94
(1889), concerning addition of the phrase "taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind,
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misrepresented these matters completely in the course of a rambling
stilted attack on California's "invidious" and "despoiling" tax laws.
Justice Field thought the argument "great."51 What the other
Justices thought is unknown. Certainly they saw the economic soft
spots and blindspots in Field's circuit opinion, for they refused, even
in the Santa Clara round, to uphold Field on the substantive issues.
Harlan, Waite, Matthews, and perhaps others, had little or no respect
for Conkling. The one sure point is that no one bothered to check
his committee journal passages or even refer to the Civil Rights
debates. Eventually, in 1890, the Court did hold, without hearing
other argument, that section 1 had restrained the state taxing power;52
yet that point had frequently been assumed by the Justices-or so it
appeared at least, from their readiness to hear due process and equal
protection invoked in such cases. What we begin to sense now-what
the Davis-Waite exchange shows-is that for this pragmatic, over-
worked Waite Court these "assumptions" did not and do not signify
all they once seemed to.
What really counted in the overall development was that by the
mid-80's, while the California Railroad Tax cases were before the
courts, the anomalies, orientation, and consequences of the "Ninth Cir-
cuit law" at last became manifest. Field and his lieutenants had
literally gone to the verge. First in the American Law Review, then
at bar conventions, "certain mischievous tendencies ... observable in
the Federal courts," particularly in those of the Ninth Circuit, gained
increasing notoriety. Criticism was not yet of dicta or doctrines,
rather of the sheltered and broadened jurisdiction-of one circuit
going it alone-of "federal interference and meddling." (On so-called
laissez-faire issues and formulations, Field of course had, and knew
that he had, bar leaders behind him, egging him on.53)
and to no other." Compare therewith the legislative history of section 16 of the Act
of May 31, 1870. The Enforcement Act, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 144; section 16 derived
from S. 365, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. (1870), introduced by Senator Stewart of Nevada
for the steamship companies and Chinese Six Companies January 10, 1870, after the
House had passed H.R. 1293, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. (1870). See CONG. GLOnz, 41st
Cong., 2d Sess., 1536, 3480, 3658, 3701 (1870).
51. See Graham, Corporate Person 203, quoting Field's letter of Feb. 18, 1883, to
Judge Deady.
52. See Bell's Gap R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232 (1890). Note that Justice
Bradley here was able to restate for a unanimous Court the views he had expressed
as a concurring minority in Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 107 (1878); the dicta
are most interesting as the law was upheld.
53. How swiftly and assiduously the bar seized on Field's San Mateo holdings at
circuit is shown in the N.Y. Tribune, Sept. 16, 1882, p. 2, col. 5, "The Tax on Foreign
Corporations." At a meeting called to plan an attack on New York's foreign corpora-
tion laws and taxes, George S. Harding, counsel for the Winchester Arms Co., "said
that Justice Field had recently given a decision in California that corporations could
not be discriminated against in the manner of which those present complained." The
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Obviously responding to this criticism, the Court in 1884 partially
clipped the Ninth Circuit's wings by holding the habeas corpus
jurisdiction of the federal courts to be concurrent rather than exclu-
sive.54 Circuit Judge Sawyer declared himself "mortified and aston-
ished," especially that Justices Field and Matthews had concurred
in the unanimous decision, for both, he confided to the sympathetic
Judge Deady, had expressed advance approval of a draft of his now-
reversed circuit holding. "So it is now settled," he added philosophi-
cally, "that we judges on this coast have been 'elevating our horns' a
little too high of late, and will have to take them down."m And so
they did have to, for by the Act of March 3, 1885, Congress at last
restored the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in habeas
corpus cases.-
By this date however Justice Field had completed his book. Another
flareup of bigotry and economic discrimination, directed chiefly
against Chinese laundries, provided the opportunity-and this time in
the Supreme Court, while Waite was ill and absent. In the first of
the two great San Francisco laundry cases, Barbier v. Connolly,
5 7
speaking for a unanimous Court, and to the surprise of San Francis-
cans upholding the ordinance, Field seized his chance to transfer the
fruits of "the Ninth Circuit law" to a majority opinion, including and
re-elaborating the lawful callings-liberty of contract dicta, the fami-
liar injunctions against "arbitrary spoliation of property," and formu-
lating the now classic private rights-police power dichotomy from
which the "rule of reason" soon was to blossom.
Ten months before this, in the Hurtado8 case, also from the Ninth
Circuit but one in which Field took no part, Mr. Justice Matthews at
last had begun to make it officially clear that the guarantee of due
process of law extended to matters of substance as well as of pro-
cedure. Field's nicely phrased and balanced Barbier dictum thus com-
pleted and articulated what was in effect, if not in intent, a new
formulary, an improved circuitry from which counsel and Court alike
reference at this date of course was to Field's decision taking jurisdiction (13 Fed.
145); the main circuit holding did not come until Sept. 25, 1882. Sawyer and Field
however for a full month had made no secret of their intentions; see Graham, Corpo-
rate Person 192-94.
54. See Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624 (1884); Graham, Field 882 n.114.
55. Ibid., quoting Sawyer's letter of May 21, 1884, to Deady; opinion by Justice
Harlan.
56. On the jurisdictional bases of the "Ninth Circuit law" see Graham, Field nn.114-
15, 117-18; Graham, Corporate Person n.85.
57. 113 U.S. 27 (1885). The Reporter's note, p. v, indicates that Waite was absent
when this case was decided Jan. 5, 1885.
58. 110 U.S. 516 (1884). Hurtado's counsel was A. L. Hart, former Attorney




might take freer readings. The galling thing was that in these vital
California Railroad Tax cases the brethren still balked. The consola-
tion was that business counsel and the state and federal judges, more
and more of whom came from the corporate bar, or hoped to land
there, meanwhile had been citing the circuit opinions on the cor-
porate "person,"59 as they now began to use this Barbier dictum. Also
heartening, on this same day of the Santa Clara decision, May 10, 1886,
the full Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Matthews in Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, the second great laundry case, struck down San Francisco's
outrageous application of its fire ordinances:
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet,
if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and
an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations
between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the
denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution. 60
Equal protection thus continued to spearhead due process and the
Chinese continued to spearhead equal protection. Business wasn't
yet getting what it wanted, but Justice Field finally, more nearly was.
"Things really are looking up... Brother Matthews61 ... a wonderful
help . . . strong . . . sound, a man of parts, too close to the Chief
perhaps ... and certainly too close in '77 to 'His Fraudulency,' Hayes
.... but shrewd, astute, a born concilator . . . Jay Gould's lawyerl
... a bridge and a bond in our Court.... And how strange it is: he
(not Brother Harlan!) a former abolitionist leader and editor-Birney's
and Bailey's successor, Salmon P. Chase's lieutenant, the young Cin-
cinnatian who led the attack on Ohio's Black laws, 1846-48 . . .
while I was in Europe . . . that 'Year of the Revolutions' . . . But
sound as I am now.., even on civil rights... and Brother Bradley62
59. See Graham, Corporate Person n.216, for examples of such usage during the years
1883-1887.
60. 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
61. Though he served only eight years, evidence points increasingly to Matthews
(1824-Mar. 22, 1889) as the swing man of the late Waite Court, in fourteenth
amendment matters particularly, bridging the period from the late '40's to the late '80's
-from Bimey, Chase, Lincoln to Grant, Hayes, Waite, Garfield and Jay Gould-a
biography is long overdue. Not to be overlooked, for example, is the fact that Matthews
also spoke for the Court-again a unanimous one-in the Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases,
115 U.S. 321 (1885) (involving a number of the same questions as the California
cases, see Graham, Corporate Person 203-05). See also MAGRATH, op. cit. supra note
1, at 198-200, especially n.84, for Matthews' role in adding the limiting phrases to
the Waite opinion in the Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U.S. 307, 331 (1886)
(decided just three weeks before Waite's Santa Clara announcement). Matthews was
responsible here for adding, "This power to regulate is not a power to destroy .
etc.
62. Evidence in the Deady collection and elsewhere indicates that relations between
Field and Bradley were strained throughout the '70's. The Legal Tender reversal,
Granger decisions, and "Stolen Election" of 1876, all were Bradley's work in Field's
eyes, and moved him at times to fury.
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too at last ... But for that dozen years: ... Legal Tender ... Munn
v. Illinois... The Electoral Commission... that dreadful decade...
But we all came around. Finally .... All but Brother Harlan . . .
The Kentucky Colonel, as he loves to say, 'is full of corl"'
This, it hardly is necessary to add, is an imaginary soliloquy. Yet
those relationships, associations, resentments, antagonisms, allusions
and illusions-all are documented.63 The sum of it is that the old
"natural rights" precepts and Lockean rhetoric pioneered by this anti-
slavery generation-literally "welded" to due process and equal pro-
tection in the 1830's-re-echoed in Hurtado, Barbier, and Yick Wo,
but not in the Civil Rights Cases.
One postulates then that if in late May 1886 Reporter Davis, left
to "determine whether anything need be said . . . in the report,"
queried Brother Field (as the Circuit Justice involved) Field's reply
was affirmative. One postulates further that in these Railroad Tax
cases the Supreme Court endeavored to do what it generally does and
always must try to do-select and decide the crucial appeals with
regard for standing law and the merits, avoiding constitutional, col-
lateral, hypothetical questions where possible. To these judges the
crucial question never had been, never could have been, simply the
corporate constitutional "person" as such; never whether corporate
persons" or "property" were to be accorded constitutional protection
in exigent cases; never whether due process could be applied to such
cases. Waite himself, we repeat, had used Ohio's clause in behalf
of the Toledo Bank in 1853.6 The important words by that date, and
increasingly for thirty years thereafter, were "liberty," "property" and
"deprived"-not "person"' or "due process." American due process
had become something different. In the course of it, the judiciary
really followed more than it led.P Pragmatist to the core, over-
whelmed with pleas, including frivolous ones, the Miller-Waite wing
went on winnowing, scrutinizing, "including and excluding," deciding
on the merits, saying as little as possible. The sum of it plainly is
that what the Court was doing during this transitional period didn't
quite accord with what it had said, and what it was saying. In the
63. The Sawyer-Field-Deady, Waite, David Davis, Harlan and other collections are
gradually shedding light on the intra-Court relations. See MAGRATH, op. cit. supra
note 1, chs. 12-15. Harlan, for example, a friend and nominee of Hayes, and as
sensitive to his prejudices and to proprieties as Field was insensitive, requested Waite
not to assign him opinions in cases decided against Conkling's clients; "from some
things I heard last winter" it was Harlan's "impression that Senator Conkling did not
feel altogether kindly to me." Waite Papers, Harlan to Waite, undated, but attached
to a Nov. 29, 1879, assignment slip. Field and Conkling shared a malignant consuming
hatred of Hayes.
64. Bank of Toledo v. City of Toledo, 1 Ohio St. 622 (1853).
65. See Graham, supra note 11, 40 CALF. L. REv. 483 (1952), and forthcoming
articles on Blackwell and frontier taxation.
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Supreme Court finally, as elsewhere, practice had got far ahead of
decision in due process matters.
The truth is that we have had, as Dr. Magrath perceives but un-
fortunately has lacked the space to show,66 altogether preposterous
ideas about the so-called Judicial or Laissez Faire Revolution; about
the conception, birth, and infancy of so-called modem or economic
due process-equal protection; about who and what were responsible
for this distinctive American development. Judicial and postbellum
storks indeed! These guarantees were in most state constitutions;
they early became among the most extensively and loosely used
weapons to challenge and to justify governmental power or action-
not, as our law school-trained generation has tended to think, to dis-
sect or cleave procedure from substance. Substantive law generally
over the centuries has been "secreted at the interstices of procedure."
Yet substantive due process somehow burst on us unawares, after the
Civil War, with scarcely a hint beforehandl
Nonsense. Probably not one early so-called "substantive" use of
due process out of a hundred ever ended up in the headnotes or
Century Digest. Yet the sparsity there, and the curt judicial rejections,
have been the assumed measure of usage, and of the whole antebellum
development. And it is this illusion that has crippled and stultified
so much research and writing in American constitutional history.
Let anyone who is skeptical of this statement and of my positions
generally, anyone still convinced that the courts led and misled the
bar and public, and not vice versa; anyone certain that no "mere"
treatise could have been an important factor in these developments
before Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (published in 1868); every-
one puzzled as to why equal protection spearheaded due process after
the war, and in these very tax cases; anyone baffled why Blackwell on
Tax Titles (of all works) appeared continually as a citation in the
briefs and opinions, not merely of these postwar tax and even Chinese
cases,67 but in the earlier due process-equal protection cases (includ-
ing that most important one of all, Wynehamer v. People,68 where it
was appropriately cited by counsel in the same breath with Solomon's
Song of Songs,0 let everyone in short who wishes in a few hours to
66. MAGRATh, op. cit. supra note 1, at 192 and pages following, especially at n.66.
67. Using the manuscript records of the old United States Circuit Court in 1936,
I remember laughing at the citation of Blackwell on Tax Titles in the briefs of a Chinese
habeas corpus casel After years of stumbling over the book, I at last examined it
carefully.
68. 13 N.Y. 378 (1856).
69. See pp. 13-14 of "Points for Plaintiff in Error," by Amasa J. Parker, Wynchamer
v. People, supra note 68, and "Additional suggestions and authorities . . ." same
counsel and case, p. 1; both in New York Court of Appeals, bound briefs, N.Y. State
Library, vol. 948, the latter citing on "property" protection: "Blackwell on Tax Titles,
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gain a fresh insight into the forces that transformed due process and
eventually judicial review-for everyone but the Negro race-let all
these get forthwith and read Blackwell on Tax Titles,70 the first edition
of which was published in Chicago in 1855, fully thirteen years before
Thomas M. Cooley graciously acknowledged his own indebtedness
by citing it at the head of his famous chapter on taxation. Read
particularly the "Introduction," and Blackwell's enthralling first chap-
ter, "Of the Fundamental Principles Which Control the Taxing Power,"
in which are gathered and synthesized, and wedded to taxation and
equal protection, all the early due process cases. Yes, here is another
fountainhead indeed.
To get back to our biography, Dr. Magrath might have clinched
his challenge of the facile thesis that the Waite Court bears the chief
responsibility for the great shifts we are speaking of by noting three
further developments: not until after Waite's death did Field himself
finally manage to make the corporate "person" truly explicit in con-
stitutional decisions; not until this same date, 1889-1890, did Justice
Bradley, speaking for a unanimous Court, clearly hold section 1 to
be a potential curb on the state taxing power;71 and in 1890 too came
the holding 2 that heralded the demise of Munn v. Illinois.73 The
late Waite years must doubtless be counted as transitional, but per-
sonnel changes which began at this time spelled the major shifts.
Between December 1887 and December 1890, Woods, Waite, Mat-
thews and Miller were succeeded by Lamar, Fuller, Brewer and
Brown. By December, 1895, Shiras, Jackson, White, and Peckham,
had replaced Bradley, Lamar, Blatchford and Jackson7 4 Aside from
a few limited "concessions," as Magrath notes, the weakened Fuller
Court, not Waite's, refashioned due process and equal protection on
the economic side. Doctrinaire Fieldian liberty of contract and due
process and the corporatized "person," and "property," caught on
15, 16, 17, 21, 22" along with Taylor v. Porter, "4 Hill, 144" "1 Ohio State R.633"-
the Ohio Chief Justice's discussion of Waite's 1853 due process argument in Bank of
Toledo v. City of Toledo, discussed herein at notes 39 and 64; the original "Points for
Plaintiff," at p. 14, citing (along with Pliny's Natural History, Herodotus, and Tacitus):
"Songs of Solomon, 8, v.12, Psalms, 104, v.14 and 15" in support of this statement
on due process: "Under these universally reserved rights, we are to be protected against
all sumptuary laws and all interference with personal rights."
70. The full title is BLACEWELL, A PRAcncAL TrEATIsE ON THE Powan To SELL
LAND FOR Tim NoN-PAYMENT OF TA ES AsSESSED THRON (1855).
71. See note 52 supra.
72. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 461 (1890) (opinion by
Blatchford, J., Miller, J., concurring; Bradley, Gray, and Lamar, JJ., dissenting).
73. 94 U.S. 113 (1877). Magrath has supplemented his chapter on the Granger
Cases with an excellent article on the Munn case in 15 AMmucAN HEErrAGE 44 (Feb.
1964).
74. MAGRATH, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 201-02, makes the point; see 3 WARREN,
TAE SUPREME CouRT IN UNITED STATES IHISTORY 482 (1923), for appointment dates.
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first in the state and lower federal courts75 and among those justices
who served short and generally rather undistinguished terms. The
Fuller and the White Courts, far more than Waite's, must bear the
burden.
Another point usually overlooked in assessing the Supreme Court's
record in this field is that, at the very least, due process and equal
protection and the corporatized "person" were and are infinitely pre-
ferable to the corporatized "citizen" and comity clause which the
corporate bar so obstinately proffered for eighty years.76 Here at
least was a discretionary formula, flexible and syncretic, a law-fact-
embracing tool in the great tradition of common law constitutionalism,
two forms which syncretized, as Professor Corwin"7 long ago demon-
strated, the constitutional rules and precedent which had developed
primarily in the state courts during the first century of judicial review.
Like our present-day transistor, due process at least did jobs more effi-
ciently, supplanted more cumbersome apparatus, operated on lower
amperages, muted natural law premises, achieved a tighter, tidier
solution. Compare with this that absurd automaton and chestnut
offered by the insurance and interstate commerce bars
Three crucial and final points: First, section 1 blanketed the freed-
men in; it couldn't and didn't throw others out. Application of these
guarantees in defense of Negro and racial rights, in other words, was
climactic, normative, additive, not original, unique, or exclusionary.
Negroes were to get what others long had had. That was the whole
thought and point. And it was precisely because the framers looked at
the matter in that light that they gave so little thought to constitution-
al mechanics other than to assuring-or so they thought-the added
power necessary to make possible a continuing progressive solution.
Second, from our vantage point today it can be seen that Justice Mil-
ler's "one pervading purpose-Negro race" rule was over-narrow, impre-
cise. Race discrimination per se, all race discrimination, not simply
that directed against the Negro race, really was the target. Miller
tripped over a small point, but he tripped, and the lucky Field capital-
ized on it for all it was worth. Third, race prejudice and race discrimi-
nation being what they are, and manifesting themselves as they did
and do-in arbitrary, invidious, often cynical and disguised action-
75. See Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE: L.J. 454 (1909), reprinted in Ass'N
oF Am. LAW SCHOOLS, SELEcTmD ESSAYS ON CONsTrrtoNA.L LAw 208 (1938); PAUL,
CONSERVATrVE Cass AND m RuLE OF LA-w (1960).
76. See Graham, Corporate Person n.97. A study of the insurance and interstate
commerce bars' efforts, both in Congress and in the Court, to corporatize the comity
clause and citizenship, 1810-1910, especially during the years 1865-1871, will document
this point overwhelmingly.




accordingly to give to the judiciary power to decide what was due and
equal and protection and what was not in this area in itself spelled a
large and imponderable increase of judicial discretion. For if courts
were not to be dupes they had, willy-nilly, to begin doing, and to
continue doing, what they thoroughly dislike to do, and often deny
that they do at all: scrutinize legislative-executive motive, purpose,
and good faith. Put a little differently, these were qualitative phrases,
standards, and tests resting on natural rights premises; as such, they
spelled new problems and burdens-many that were not sensed at all
at the time. But these difficulties obviously are inherent in the prob-
lem and in the objective, not alone in the constitutional forms or
texts.78
Why has not more of this been seen clearly before? Why indeed,
judges and historians may well ask and commiserate one another.
Their troubles stem from that common source-common law constitu-
tionalism. Anachronism is bred right into both fields: as the institu-
tionalized method of the one (re-read Dicey's 9 brilliant introduction
on the ways and uses of precedent); as the bane, the occupational
hazard of the other-especially of legal and constitutional historians
whose "sources" (precedents read in reverse) soon come to mean and
to cover so much more than ever is originally conceived, intended, or
said.
So it chanced that the Beards' Conspiracy Theory, or, speaking more
accurately, the Progressive-New Deal generations' Conspiracy Theory,
really was anachronized-"Pogo"-ized-history. To quote the learned
Walt Kelly,80 "Incongruity is the nature of the natural . . .. You
develops a good memory, then you reverses the whole process." Due
process easiest, certainly first, of all! Forty years of constitutional de-
velopment were misread, and read back into, that one word, "person."
The miracle was that the second fluke-the reversed image of the
first-helped expose, caricature, in time perhaps, correct the original.
Only the Negro race-only the avowed, intended beneficiaries-had to
wait still longer.
Fluke, fiction, imposter-constitutionally, historically, historiographi-
cally. Such is the record and the verdict on the corporate "person."
So far as sections 1 and 5 as a whole are concerned, it is clear enough
now that history and interpretation, not draftsmanship, were what
78. This of course is the answer to all talk about "poor draftsmanship."
79. See DicEr, INTRODUCTION TO THE STuDY OF THE LAW OF TnE CoNsnrrtroN 15-
19 (7th ed. 1908).
80. Quotations of the Okefenokee scholars are from that brilliant series of "Pogo"
published Dec. 18, 1963, to Jan. 9, 1964, climaxing: "I predicts that on January first,
1863, A. Lincoln will issue the Emancipation Proclamation!" "Manl That's not Futurel




got sophisticated and misread.
The ultimate irony is that both the Waite Court and the Negro race
caught it coming and going. Belabored as "anticorporate," even "com-
munistic," in its own day by business and bar leaders, as Magrath
shows, the Waite Court got tagged and re-slandered again in ours as
the one that "reneged," "caved in," "reversed itself" on the corporate"person," automatically corporatizing due process and equal protec-
tion, completing these framers' intended revolution (i.e., a revolution
by constitutional amendmentl), accomplishing all this by a one-word
construction, by "mere acquiescence," when as a matter of fact the
shifts and the development of course required decades and literally
thousands of cases.
This was the imagined, the postulated, the fictitious Due Process or
Judicial Revolution. Yet all the while there also was a real one-
flagrant, disastrous, generally ignored: the 1883 Civil Rights decision
that de-racialized, instanto, "by a subtle and ingenious verbal criti-
cism," precisely those protections which Justice Bradley himself so
clearly had seen and regarded as necessary and appropriate in 1871.
The haunting realization thus is that the corporate fluke, the eventual
hypertrophy of the fourteenth amendment on the economic side, com-
pletely overshadowed and obscured the misreading, the reneging,
the stasis and paralysis that developed on the racial side. Inaction
ignored, inaction institutionalized, inaction alibied (as even Dr.
Magrath is too ready to alibi it-Waite simply was "a man of his era")
became inaction indeed. De-racializing equal protection, not corpo-
ratizing it-this was our national catastrophe.
Underscoring so much while leaving so much unsaid, this book
is a powerful plea for post-1937 trends and constructions-not merely
in the Supreme Court, but now in Congress. How does the nation,
the Court, the Congress, make good a lost century? Chief Justice
Waite's triumph-decidedly more modest in my estimation than in
Dr. Magrath's-was that he dared, tried, succeeded-at least by half.
The country's failure was that it so long did not-has not yet-even
by half.
Twenty years and three constitutional amendments after emancipa-
tion too many of our forebears, including all members of this Court
except the former Union colonel and converted slaveholder, Mr.
Justice Harlan, let themselves be persuaded, as too many others have
since, that American governments still lacked the mandate and the
power to do, after emancipation and amendment, in behalf of
"liberty," what those same governments originally, for three quarters
of a century, had been able to do, and had done, against "liberty,"
in defense of slavery and slave "property." No mandate and no power
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to protect the "li(ves), liberty and property" of "persons" at last free,
nor of those newly-made "Citizens of the United States" for whose
double, triple, above all, equal protection, these three overlapping
guarantees and clauses again had been employed, both affirmatively
and negatively, as they had been employed incessantly for two genera-
tions. No mandate and no power to protect as free "persons," and as
"Citizens of the United States," those whom this antislavery generation
at least, believed governments had the power and the duty to protect
even as enslaved "persons."
Two years short of the fourteenth amendment centennial, let us
speak no more of the "failures" and of the "miserable draftsmanship"
of that Joint Committee of Fifteen. John A. Bingham and his col-
leagues did very well indeed. The date, remember, was 1866.
